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The Role of Government in the Securities Market
JAMES R. LOTHIAN*
The author discusses the need for and the desirability of
governmental regulation of the securities market. This assess-
ment, which is made from an economic perspective, leads to the
conclusion that the SEC is ineffective in protecting investors and
that the regulatory role of the government should be diminished.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When a specialist in one area overcomes the sense of timidity
that usually deters his venturing into another discipline, the greet-
ing he receives is often less than enthusiastic. Practitioners in the
field tend to view him as something of an intellectual imperialist
and to dismiss his observations as overly simplistic. Their facial
reactions usually tell the story, ranging from a grimace at the cheek-
iness of the intruder to a nod to one or another of their colleagues
as if to say, "Well, what he proposes is all well and good but the
issues are just much more complex."
Fortunately, the link between economics and law is a good deal
stronger than those that bind most other disciplines. The reason, of
course, is that much of our legislation is rationalized along economic
lines. A fair amount of it deals with what are narrowly conceived to
be economic issues-the securities market, as every economist who
has ever been buttonholed at a cocktail party for a stock tip can
attest, being perhaps the prime example-and almost all of it has
an economic impact, however indirect.
Before examining the appropriateness of legislation dealing
specifically with the securities market, I will briefly review the ways
in which economists have tended to view the regulatory process in
general. After outlining the conditions under which governmental
regulation can confer a net economic benefit on society, I will con-
sider some of the empirical evidence that has been amassed on the
extent to which regulation actually has this effect.
* Vice President, Economics Department, Citibank, N.A.; research associate, National
Bureau of Economic Research. The author wishes to thank Richard Burrell and Arthur
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The result of that exercise necessarily leads me to ask the ques-
tion about securities regulation that Professor Loss, at the outset of
his remarks, explicitly sought to avoid: whether we need a federal
securities code to begin with.'
The answer, as I see it, is no. Historical analysis of the economic
situation at the time the SEC was set up, contrary to the folklore
surrounding the period, does not reveal any reason for singling out
the securities market. And the weight of the evidence from detailed
empirical studies of securities market regulation shows little or no
positive economic effects.2 Given the costs of maintaining the regu-
latory apparatus and of compliance with regulatory legislation and
SEC directives, the net impact of such regulation is, therefore,
likely to be negative. A new securities code that will leave many
features of the current system of regulation intact seems to me
hardly likely to shift the balance in the opposite direction.
Government can, however, play a positive role in the securities
market, but to do so, it will have to follow a far different path from
the one it is on now. I discuss this at the end of the paper.
II. REGULATION: SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES
Economists' standard rationale for governmental regulation
and other forms of governmental intervention is the existence of
market imperfections in particular industries.' According to the
theory, these flaws result in too little or too much of a particular
good being consumed or produced, as the case may be. In short, the
industry is economically inefficient. Underproduction would occur,
for instance, if a firm had a monopoly position. To maximize its own
profit position, it would be led to restrict its output, thus increasing
the price of its product to a point where it no longer equaled the
costs of production, which include a competitive return to the own-
ers of the firm on their investment. Government regulation that
increased competition would lead to an increased output and a
lower price. Economic efficiency would, therefore, be enhanced,
since the larger output would result in some shift of capital and
labor to the industry where, had the market worked well, they would
have been employed to begin with. At the same time, consumers
would be better off since the lower price would enable them to
increase their purchases of that industry's product rather than hav-
1. Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV.,1431 (1979).
2. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 infra.
3. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 271-86 (2d ed. 1977).
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ing to settle for some less-valued substitutes.'
Overproduction and overconsumption might occur if one of the
resources an industry used were priced below its true value. For
example, consider a chemical firm that freely discharged effluents
into a nearby lake. The firm would be treating one resource, water,
as if it had no value at all. In actuality, however, as anyone who has
compared prices of waterfront houses with those further inland can
attest, clean water is usually far from free. If government regulatory
action forced the firm to treat the waterway at its true cost by
compensating other users of the lake, then there would be a salutary
economic effect. The resulting higher product price would eliminate
the overconsumption, and hence, the overproduction of the chemi-
cal. And the pollution of the lake-the wasting of a scarce resource,
clean water-would be reduced.
A big "if" in all of this, however, is how far the government goes
in its regulatory actions. If government regulators were to totally
elimate water pollution, even in cases where the lake, although pol-
luted, had alternative uses and, therefore, a positive value, then
economic efficiency might well decrease rather than increase. A
similar result would obtain if they were to push the price in a mono-
polistic industry below the true cost of production. In both instan-
ces, the cure would be worse than the disease.
Whether or not regulation is ultimately beneficial depends in
part upon the information available to the regulators. For their
actions to result in an economic benefit greater than that inherent
in the original situation, they would have to have a good deal of
knowledge about the industry being regulated. In our rationalistic
age, in which mathematical models of the economy and the comput-
ers used to implement them have taken on the role of idols, one
might presume that such knowledge would be easily acquired. But,
as Noble Laureaute F.A. Hayek has pointed out in a now classic
discussion of the subject,' the opposite presumption is likely to be
closer to the truth. In an economy as complex and rapidly evolving
as ours, producers continually have to adapt to new information. To
do so requires a high degree of specialized knowledge. That knowl-
edge is unlikely to be available to the regulator. The potential for
error, and, hence, of worsening an already imperfect situation is
great.
A more serious objection to the standard story about govern-
ment regulation, however, is that it begs the question of what the
4. Id. at 3-14.
5. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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regulations are designed to do. It presumes that the prime motivat-
ing force behind regulatory legislation is the redress of economic
wrongs, that what matters to legislators is economic efficiency.
While public interest theories of legislation such as this may
help sell grammar school civics texts, and for that matter introduc-
tory college economics textbooks, they strike the more perspicacious
observer as somewhat naive. The problem with the argument is that
each legislator is presumed to have an overriding concern with
things economic except where they impinge directly upon his own
well-being-a man of economics, but not an economic man. Indeed,
the most ascetic professor of economics in the nation's most presti-
gious research institution hardly minimizes profits.
And that's the rub. There are powerful forces that push legisla-
tors along paths that are quite divergent from those leading to the
public good. Many economists would now argue, as George Stigler
has done,' that studies of government regulation lead to the conclu-
sion that the motivating force behind it is not the public interest but
some well-organized group with political clout-be it a trade or
professional association, a labor union or whatever-that will bene-
fit from the regulations. The reason, in Stigler's view, is that the
benefits of regulation accrue to relatively few while the negative
effects are, in general, spread out over the rest of' society. Thus,
however great the losses may be in the aggregate, they are suffi-
ciently small for any individual not part of the group benefited that
lobbying against regulation does not pay. The costs to him from
doing so exceed the potential gains.
How closely the details of Stigler's model fit the facts has been
debated.7 Studies of regulation such as those reviewed by William
A. Jordan afnd Richard A. Posner in their detailed surveys of the
literature show that its general thrust is entirely correct.s In no
6. Stigler, A General Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MNGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
7. E.g., Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211
(1976). Peltzman contends that the benefits and liabilities of regulations are a function ol
the economic climate in which they were passed. He extends Stigler's model to try to explain
what he regards as the more general outcome in a regulated market. "Regulations will tend
to be more heavily weighted toward 'producer protection' in depressions and toward
'consumer protection' in expansion." Id. at 227.
8. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government
Regulation, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 151 (1973); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL
J. ECON. & MNGMT. Sci. 335 (1974).
A conclusion related to that drawn in Stigler's model was reached in a study of the effects
of deregulation in a particular market. The authors determined that deregulation resulted
from changes in the economic interests of the groups affected by fixed commission rates
[Vol. -33:1587
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
instance that they cite does the traditional explanation of promo-
tion of the public interest, in the sense of increasing economic el'fi-
ciency, appear to hold. Stigler's alternative explanation, or some-
thing close to it, proves far superior.
III. REGULATION AND SECURITIES MARKETS
Given this general experience with regulation, one necessarily
has to be somewhat dubious about whether the SEC's regulation of
th6 securities markets serves the public interest. The Commission
claims, of course, that it does.
The Commission rationalizes its role with the observation that
"securities are by their very nature much different from almost any
other type of 'merchandise' for which there are established public
markets."9 The reason for the difference, the agency says, is that
individuals have greater difficulty evaluating the true worth of se-
curities than that of any other good."' As the SEC sees itself, its
mandate is to overcome these difficulties, to ensure that firms pro-
vide adequate information to buyers of securities and to eliminate
fraudulent practices in their sale."
The economic turmoil of the Depression era, the period in
which the first securities acts were passed, seemed to lend credence
to the idea that such governmental actions were needed. So, before
going on to consider the internal logic of the SEC's argument, 1
would like to review briefly what happened then.
In 1933, the country had just gone through the stock market
crash of 1929 and was still in the throes of its worst depression. The
crash, moreover, was widely viewed as its cause. Added to that were
the equally widespread beliefs that the securities market was rife
with fraudulent practices and that business in general had failed the
nation. It is not surprising, therefore, that securities regulation
came into being when it did. What is surprising, given the new
knowledge we have gained since 1933 about the causes of the De-
pression, is that the historical rationale for securities regulation has
remained virtually unquestioned.
Popularized accounts of the era notwithstanding, it is now quite
established by the regulations. Roberts, Phillips & Zecher, Deregulation of Fixed Commission
Rates in the Securities Industry, in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING & SECURITIES
INDUSTRIES 151, 161 (L. Goldberg & L. White eds. 1979).
9. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, forward (Wash. D.C. 1978).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1.
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clear that the stock market crash had little to do with the economic
upheaval that subsequently occurred. The major reason the Depres-
sion became so severe, as Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in
their study of U.S. monetary history have demonstrated, 2 was not
the severity of the stock market crash but the ineptitude of Federal
Reserve monetary policy at the time. In the face of a protracted
series of banking panics, the Federal Reserve stood pat. It kept its
own monetary liabilities-currency and bank reserves-virtually
constant throughout the period. The result was that banks failed en
masse and the amount of money in circulation- currency and com-
mercial bank deposits-fell by an historically unprecedented 33%.
The effect on output and unemployment was catastrophic.
Relative to that shock to the economy, the stock market crash
in 1929 was at most a minor exacerbating factor. It may have helped
to initiate the onset of the Depression but could hardly account for
either its severity or extended duration. The decreases in stock
prices that took place in the 1930's, as opposed to those in late 1929,
were more the result than a cause of what happened elsewhere in
the economy. Rather than being a reflection of some previous over-
valuation of equities by the market, they appear to have been a
response to the rapidly deterioriating business environment." It is,
therefore, doubtful that any amount of information of the type now
required by the SEC could have avoided that part of the price fall.
Now, what about the allegation that the market for securities
is different from all other markets? Suppose for a moment we take
a look at other investment goods. Housing and other consumer dura-
12. M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960,
at 299-419 (1963); Friedman & Schwartz, Money and Business Cycles, 45 REv. ECON. & STATS.
32, 52 (Supp. 1963).
For a critical analysis of the view that the Great Depression was the result of' a series of
special events, one of which was the stock market crash, see Gandolfi & Lothian, Did Mone-
tary Forces Cause the Great Depression: A Review Essay, 9 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 679
(1977).
13. Movements in stock prices over the period are revealing in this regard. The crash
itself' obviously had a sizeable impact-the monthly Standard and Poor's composite index
(1941-43= 100) fell dramatically from its post World War I peak of 31.30 in September 1929
to 20.58 in November. But that was it. In the next six months, close to half' of that movement
was reversed and even as late as September of 1930, the index had still not fallen below its
November 1929 level. By far the greatest drop occurred thereafter in the period when the
Depression could have been expected to worsen for other, particularly monetary, reasons. The
index fell with minor interruptions through 1931 and 1932 until it finally bottomed out at
4.77 in June of the next year. Cf. M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960, at 304 (1963) (charting Standard & Poor's common stock
price index, 1929-33). If the crash had been largely responsible for the Depression, then it is
far from obvious why stock prices followed the course they did.
[Vol. 33:1587
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bles like cars, calculators, stereo equipment, appliances and even
education are prime examples. The nature of' these goods is such
that evaluating their quality usually requires highly specific knowl-
edge, something that few people possess prior to seriously entertain-
ing the idea of purchase. But even though none of these markets is
heavily regulated in the sense that there is no mandatory disclosure
of information pertaining to product quality, anyone who so desires
can usually find out what he wants to know. The reason is that the
market provides information in one way or another.
Consider education, for instance. Universities as a whole and
particular departments within them establish reputations and pub-
lish literature that provide indications of the quality of' their facul-
ties. In addition, various independent sources publish rating reports
to which one can refer. Similarly, in the area of housing, there are
consulting engineers and, often times, real estate agents, who for a
small fraction of the purchase price will evaluate the condition of a
house. In like manner, buyers of most other consumer durables can
use the reputations of the manufacturers and retailers as general
indicators of product quality and of the availability of' repair serv-
ices. Consumers willing to search for it can obtain additional infor-
mation through magazine and newspaper columns, independent
product-testing agencies and product prices. In these areas in which
consumers make important, investment-type expenditures, the val-
ues of the products are difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, buyers
seem to be able to acquire reasonably good information about qual-
ity, despite the absence of governmental regulation.
If the securities market is indeed different from those fbr other
goods, then this variance must arise from something other than the
difficulty of ascertaining the values of securities, which is the SEC's
claimed distinction.'4 I maintain that the differences run mostly in
the opposite direction, that information can be more easily come by
in the securities market than in most other markets. The principal
reason is that the securities market is better organized and more
highly integrated than most other markets. So, even if' participants
in the securities market had exactly the same characteristics as
those in other markets, one would expect the securities market to
be more efficient. Securities prices incorporate all relevant informa-
tion more rapidly and, hence, at any point in time, they should be
better indicators of product worth than prices in most other mar-
kets."
14. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text, supra.
15. There is now an extensive literature on this subject. For a summary article, see
19791
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Adding to this greater efficiency of securities markets, I sus-
pect, is the sophistication of market participants. "' This should be
greater in securities markets than elsewhere, since the potential
returns from accumulating such knowledge are likely to be higher
in securities markets. Individuals who purchase or sell securities
often do so on a fairly regular basis. By contrast, individuals dealing
in other markets, like those for houses or automobiles, generally
engage in transactions much more infrequently. Therefore, they
would have less incentive to build up knowledge about those mar-
kets than would the more regular participants in securities markets.
One question a proponent of regulation would ask, however, is
whether accurate information would be forthcoming if regulations
did not exist. In the abstract, the answer seems clear. As Professor
Benston pointed out, an incentive for firms to disclose information
valued by investors would exist even in the absence of the SEC.' 7 If
investors valued a particular type of information and a firm with-
held it, then the firm's stock would sell at a discount.
The SEC views disclosure of information by firms offering to
sell securities as more than a means of enabling investors to evalu-
ate the true value of the securities. The regulations are intended also
to prevent fraudulent practices in the sale of securities.'" Just as
mandatory disclosure is not needed to inform buyers of the value of
stocks, however, it is unnecessary to effect this second of the SEC's
stated goals. The disclosure required by the securities regulations is
not an investor's sole safeguard against fraud. The function of inde-
pendent auditors is to report fully and accurately about a firm's
financial status. This role can be carried out as easily in an unregu-
lated as in a regulated environment.
There is little evidence that the type of information which firms
are required by the SEC to disclose is very valuable to begin with.
In addition to the pioneering work of George Stigler in this area,"
there are a number of papers by Professor Benston"' and others2'
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE
383 (1970).
16. For an analysis of the relationship between the knowledge of market participants and
their responsiveness to new developments in the market in the context of farmers' adoption
of new technology, see Huffman, Allocative Efficiency: The Role of Human Capital, 91 Q.J.
EcON. 59 (1977); Huffman, Decision Making: The Role of Education, AM. J. AGRICULT. ECON.
85 (1974).
17. Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1471 (1979).
18. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
19. E.g., Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUSINESS 117 (1964).
20. E.g., Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required
[Vol. 33:1587
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that lead to the conclusion that this information is not of value to
the investor.
2
The only area in which the SEC appears to have had a measur-
able effect is the brokerage industry. The introduction of SEC regu-
lation appears to have adversely affected profits of brokerage firms
while the more recently mandated change in brokerage fees appears
to have made those fees more competitive.23
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Close to a decade ago, the American Enterprise Institute spon-
sored a debate between George Stigler and former chairman of the
SEC Manuel Cohen on whether regulatory agencies can protect the
consumer. 4 Stigler's conclusion was that the SEC had been of no
benefit whatsoever to investors. He issued a call for the SEC to
produce bona fide scholarly evidence on the subject, saying that
"the presumption has got to be on the regulatorybody to show what
it's doing, not upon those who are outside."25
Since then, the only studies that I know of have come from
outside and, in the main, they have hardly served to shore up the
SEC's position.26 Given the dearth of favorable evidence and given
what I regard as extremely tenuous historical and logical arguments
in behalf of the SEC, out and out repeal of the securities codes
might be the route to take.
If the idea were truly to aid investors, then eliminating regula-
tion seems to be the preferable alternative. The simple fact is that
compliance with SEC disclosure rules has some costs, perhaps fairly
considerable ones. The proliferation of regulation in recent years
doubtless is one reason for the poor performance of the equity mar-
kets.
Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 30 (1977); Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973).
21. E.g., Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW 631 (1973).
22. There are various recently published results that are consistent with the finding.
E.g., Horowitz & Kolodny, Line of Business Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis of
an SEC Disclosure Rule, 8 BELL J. ECON. 234 (1977) (investigating newly proposed line-of
business reporting); Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading, 5 BELL J.
ECON. 93 (1974) (investigating effect of introduction of rules prohibiting insider trading).
23. See Ofer & Melnick, Price Deregulation in the Brokerage Industry: An Empirical
Analysis, 9 BELL J. ECON. 633 (1978); Schwert, Public Regulation of National Securities
Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis, 8 BELL J. ECON. 128 (1977).
24. G. STIGLER & M. COHEN, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT THE CONSUMER? (1971).
25. Id. at 73.
26. E.g., Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW
293 (1975).
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What I suspect has played an even greater role is the type of
macroeconomic policies that the government has followed. The
high and variable rates of inflation that the United States and most
other industrial countries have experienced since the mid 1960's
have been the direct outcome. The uncertainty that has resulted has
increased the costs of doing business and, I would argue, has had
an even greater negative impact on securities prices than all of the
regulations combined.27
A return to stable macroeconomic policies and a diminution of
the government's role in the microeconomic sphere-curbing the
powers of the SEC, FTC and virtually every other acronymic agency
one would care to mention-to my mind would go farther in protect-
ing the individual investor than anything else.
27. See generally P. CAGAN & R. LIPSEY, THE FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF INFLATION (1978);
Friedman, Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment, 85 J. POL. ECON. 451 (1977).
